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HOUSEHOLD SPECIALIZATION
AND THE MALE MARRIAGE WAGE PREMIUM
JONI HERSCH and LESLIE S. STRATTON*

Empirical research has consistently shown that married men have
substantially higher wages, on average, than otherwise similar unmarried men. One commonly cited hypothesis to explain this pattern is that
marriage allows one spouse to specialize in market production and the
other to specialize in home production, enabling the former-usually
the husband-to acquire more market-specific human capital and, ultimately, earn higher wages. The authors test this hypothesis using panel
data from the National Survey of Families and Households. The data
reveal that married men spent virtually the same amount of time on
home production as did single men, albeit on different types of housework. Estimates from a fixed effects wage equation indicate that the
male marriage wage premium is not substantially affected by controls for
home production activities. Household specialization, the authors
conclude, does not appear to have been responsible for the marriage
premium in this sample.

V

irtually
all wage
regressions
an
indicator
of marital
statusincluding
find that
married men have substantially higher
wages than do not-married men, even after
controls are added for observable human
capital andjob characteristics. The magnitude varies but is quite large, with typical
values indicating that married men receive
a wage premium of 10-30%. While the
empirical evidence of a marriage premium
for men is incontrovertible, the precise
nature of the relation has not yet been
convincingly explained. A leading theory
is that specialization within the household

*Joni Hersch is Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law
School and Leslie Stratton is Assistant Professor of
Economics at Virginia Commonwealth University.

results in genuine productivity differences
between married men who have the opportunity to specialize and unmarried men
who do not. Lacking direct measures of
specialization and time allocation, studies
have used wife's employment status as a
proxy for specialization, and ensuing results have been inconsistent.
An important contribution of this paper
is the use of more direct measures of time
allocation to control for specialization

A data appendix with additional results and copies
of the computer programs used to generate the results presented in the paper are available from Leslie
Stratton at the Department of Economics, Virginia
Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 232844000.
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THE MALE MARRIAGE WAGE PREMIUM
within the household. We use panel data
from the National Survey of Families and
Households that include information on
time allocated to nine different home production activities. With these data we investigate whether the observed marriage premium is due to specialization within the
household.
Background
Two primary explanations have been
advanced regarding the wage premium for
married men.' One is that more productive
men marry, and the other is that marriage
makes men more productive.2 If more productive men marry, then men who marry
should be more productive and receive
higher wages throughout their lifetime. In
this case, marriage is serving as a proxy for
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with productivity, and the marital wage
differential is attributable to selection. If,
on the other hand, marriage makes men
more productive, then wages should increase following marriage.
A substantial literature examines these
competing hypotheses and the source of
the underlying productivity differential. If
more productive men are selected into
marriage, then marriage and wages are
jointly endogenous. Using instrumental
variables estimation on a cross-section of
data to control for this possible joint
endogeneity, Nakosteen and Zimmer
(1987) found that the magnitude of the
marriage premium was unchanged but that
it became statistically insignificant, a finding they interpreted as evidence that the
marriage premium is due to selection.

'Excellent surveys of the literature specifically examining the premium appear in Korenman and
Neumark (1991) and Loh (1996).
2
An alternative explanation is that married men

are more likely to choose jobs with undesirable and
hence wage-compensating characteristics (Reed and

Harford 1989). However, Hersch (1991) reported a
statistically significant marital wage differential even
after controlling for job characteristics.

However, it is difficult to find suitable instruments for marriage, and findings based
on weak or invalid instruments are suspect.
Recent investigations have used panel data
to estimate fixed effects models, thereby
netting out any unobserved individual-specific fixed effect that may be correlated
with both marriage and wages. Using this
approach, Korenman and Neumark (1991)
concluded that at most 20% of the observed premium is due to selection. Other
researchers (Cornwell and Rupert 1997;
Daniel 1991; Gray 1997) also have reported
finding a marriage premium in fixed effects estimates, though often of a smaller
magnitude than that found by Korenman
and Neumark. An alternative selection
mechanism, for which fixed effects models
would not correct, posits that men with
more rapid wage growth (rather than men
with higher wage levels) may be more likely
to marry. Both Korenman and Neumark
(1991) and Gray (1997) tested for but found
no evidence of such selection.
If marriage somehow makes men more
productive, one possible implication is that
men who have been married longer receive
higher wages. In fact, Kenny (1983),
Korenman and Neumark (1991), and
Daniel (1991) found faster wage growth for
married men, particularly early in marriage.
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) contested these
findings, but overall the evidence tends to
support the productivity hypothesis.
Although the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that marriage enhances
productivity, the causal mechanism is less
clear. The theory most often referenced is
Becker's theory of the family (1991). According to this theory, it is efficient for one
spouse to specialize in market production
and the other to specialize in home production. The spouse (usually the husband)
who devotes more time to market production will acquire more market-specific human capital, which will lead to an increase
in market productivity and thereby to higher
wages.
A number of other arguments can also
be made linking marriage, specialization,
and wages. Becker's (1985) model of effort
posits that total effort is limited and any
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effort allocated to housework reduces the
effort available for market work. If increased effort means increased productivity and increased wages, then men may
benefit from specialization because they
are able to expend more effort on-the-job
following marriage. Alternatively, married
men's wages may increase via specialization
in particular types of home production activity. Even if marriage does not affect
either total market hours or total time on
home production, certain household activities may cause intermittent disruptions
to the workday. For instance, those who
need to stay at home for emergency home
repairs or emergency child care obligations may find their productivity is affected
by such disruptions to their schedule. Specialization could reduce these disruptions
to market work for men if after marriage
they are less likely to be called upon to
interrupt their workday.
Efforts to test the specialization hypothesis have used measures of the wife's employment as a proxy for specialization. The
argument is that if marriage enhances market productivity by allowing men to specialize, then married men whose wives do not
work in the market (or whose wives work
fewer hours) will have higher wages than
will either unmarried men or men with
employed wives. Using cross-sectional data,
Loh (1996) found that married men whose
wives worked in the market received higher
wages. Daniel (1991) and Gray (1997),
on the other hand, found the expected
inverse relation between the husband's
wage and his wife's market hours-a relation that persists in fixed effects and instrumental variables estimates accounting for the possible endogeneity of the
wife's market hours with her husband's
wage.
These conflicting results suggest that
wives' market hours are a weak indicator of
household specialization. Indeed, theoretically the effect on the husband's time of
his wife's employment status could go either way, as there are competing income
and substitution effects. Married men with
employed wives may spend less time on
housework than men whose wives are not

employed because household income is
greater, or they may spend more time because the value of their spouse's time may
be greater. The net effect will depend on
the magnitude of these two components.
Use of spousal employment as a proxy for
household specialization implicitly assumes
that the substitution effect dominates the
income effect. However, research by
South and Spitze (1994) indicates that
the time allocated to home production
by husbands whose wives are employed is
not substantially different from the time
allocated by husbands whose wives are
not employed.
The goal of this study is to use data on
time allocated to housework to directly examine whether the marriage premium can
be attributed to specialization within the
household. Compared to the wife's employment status, which has a theoretically
ambiguous relation to the husband's housework time or effort and therefore to his
investments in market capital, own housework time provides a more direct indicator
of the extent of specialization within the
household. If marriage is merely a proxy
for specialization, then inclusion of home
production time should reduce or eliminate the marriage premium.
Data
We use data from the National Survey of
Families and Households (NSFH-see
Sweet and Bumpass [1995] and Sweet,
Bumpass, and Call [1988] for a more complete description). This is a national sample
of 13,008 households, with a double sample
of minorities, single parents, stepparents,
cohabitors, and recently married persons
who were interviewed once in 1987-88 and
again in 1992-94. This data set has two key
attributes. First, the survey includes measures of time spent on nine types of household activities. Second, it provides panel
data that allow us to estimate fixed effects
equations on housework time and wages.
Since we have two years of data for this
sample, this amounts to estimation in first
differences.
We restrict our analysis to employed,
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white, non-Hispanic3 men, age 18-59 at the
time of the first survey, who were not students and who reported valid information
on all the variables used in the wage analysis for both years of the survey. These
restrictions result in a sample size of 1,373.
While this sample is substantially smaller
than the original data set, most observations are lost due to gender, race, and age
restrictions. Bysample design, within households with more than one adult, one adult
was randomly chosen as the primary respondent. Although information was also
elicited from other household members,
primary respondents were asked to provide
the more extensive information used in
this paper. Almost 60% of the primary
sample respondents were women, almost
28% were non-white or Hispanic, and at
least 21% were over the age of 64 at the time
of the second survey; white, non-Hispanic
men of working age comprised less than a
quarter of the sample. Sample attrition
between surveys for this group ran about
19%, somewhat less than that for the entire
sample, bringing the potential sample size
below 2,500. Just over 10% of this sample
were in school or in the military, and another 10% were not employed, at the time
of at least one of the surveys. Excluding
those individuals who did not report a wage
or reported one below $2.50 or above $75
per hour in 1992 dollars, and those with
incomplete work or marital histories, re4
sults in a final sample of 1,373.

'Hispanic men are excluded for three reasons.
First, the NSFH does not separately inquire about
race and ethnicity. Thus, the racial composition of
the Hispanic sample is uncertain, and all the studies
cited herein regarding the marital wage differential
restrict analysis to white men. Second, the only study
to discuss Hispanics (Daniel 1991) explicitly excluded
them on the grounds that a dummy variable alone was
not sufficient to explain ethnic wage differences.
Finally, regression estimates using the NSFH sample
of Hispanic men find no statistically significant mari-

tal wage differential.
4

In addition, for eleven of the respondents, com-

puted wage differs by more than a factor of five
between the first and second survey. At least one of
these wage measures was invariably calculated based
on a measure of usual annual or monthly earnings

Primary respondents were asked to provide extensive demographic information
including age, education, marital status and
history, family composition, number of
children in the household in each of three
age groups (under age 6, between age 6
and 12, and between age 13 and 18), and
whether they had a disability that affected
their ability to work. Labor market information included wages and method of payment (for example, hourly or salaried),
number of hours worked per week, years of
work experience and tenure, and industry/
occupation of employment.5 Hourly wage
is calculated in the usual manner from
information on earnings, method of payment, and hours worked, and is converted
to 1992 constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for
the sample based on data from the first
survey, stratified by marital status as of the
first survey date. We consider three marital
status categories: currently married; divorced, separated, or widowed (henceforth
previously married); and never married.
Sixty-six percent of the men were married,
and 14.6% had previously been married
but were unmarried at the time of the survey. As the values indicate, married men
had hourly earnings about 7% higher than
previously married men and about 35%
higher than never-married men. Although
there are statistically significant differences
by marital status in the means of many of
the variables (indicated in the last column
of Table 1), the most substantial differentials are in age, experience, tenure, and
children. The differentials in experience

and is likely incorrect. Panel estimates are especially
sensitive to such measurement error; hence these
observations were excluded. Also excluded were a
handful of observations lacking information on other
variables used in the regression analysis, such as education.
5
Consistent information on union status is unavailable from this survey. The estimated returns to
marriage are unaffected by exclusion of the available
measures; hence these measures are excluded from
the specifications presented in this paper.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by First-Wave Marital Status.
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)

Married

Divorced,
Separated,
Widowed

Never
Married

Significant
Differences,

15.75

14.72

11.62

b,c

(8.43)

(7.26)

(6.59)

Education

13.87

13.48

13.79

Work Experience

(2.62)
15.73
(8.61)

(2.60)
18.73
(8.90)

(2.46)
7.54
(6.33)

a,b,c

b,c

Variable

Hourly Wage (1992$)

Tenure
Hours Worked per Week
Age
Years Married
Lives in South
Lives in SMSA

7.88

9.17

3.72

(7.20)

(8.09)

(4.06)

46.47

45.61

44.29

(9.68)

(10.69)

(10.15)

35.95

38.41

27.52

(8.53)

(9.09)

(7.13)

11.87

10.75

(8.61)

(7.74)

0

0.32

0.31

0.27

(0.47)

(0.46)

(0.44)

0.70

0.71

0.78

Disability Affecting Work

(0.46)
0.01

(0.45)
0.04

(0.42)
0.02

Children under Age 6

(0.11)
0.57

(0.18)
0.12

(0.12)
0.05

(0.80)
0.44
(0.74)

(0.41)
0.26
(0.57)

(0.26)
0.06
(0.32)

0.35
(0.68)

0.24
(0.55)

0.16
(0.43)

Children Age 6-12

Children Age 13-18
Sample Size
% of Total

909
66.2%

200
14.6%

b
a,b,c
a,b,c

b

a,b
a,b,c

b

264
19.2%

'Statistically significant differences in means at p < 0.01, where a = married vs. divorced, separated, widowed;
b = married vs. never married; and c = divorced, separated, widowed vs. never married.

and tenure are important because these
variables are typically found to be important determinants of wages. We explore
the role of children separately in the wage
analysis. The lower average wage for nevermarried men is certainly due in part to the
fact that they had lower experience and
tenure than ever-married men.
Since those changing marital status are
the primary force behind the fixed effects
estimates, it is important to examine the
frequency of marital status changes within
the sample. Within the almost six years
between survey periods, 22% of the respondents in the panel data sample changed
marital status. Eleven percent of the men

who were married as of the first wave were
no longer married by the second wave, and
45% of the men classified as previously
married at the time of the first wave had
remarried by the second wave. Of the men
who had never been married as of the first
wave, 39% were classified as married and
another 6% as previously married by the
time of the second wave.
The detailed information on home production essential to this study was elicited
by asking respondents to report the time
spent by themselves on nine activities: "meal
preparation" (MEALS), "washing dishes and
cleaning up after meals" (DISHEs), "house
cleaning" (CLEANING), "outdoor and other

THE MALE MARRIAGE WAGE PREMIUM
household maintenance tasks" (OUTDOOR
& MAINTENANCE), "shopping for groceries
and other household goods" (SHOPPING),
"washing, ironing and mending" (LAUNDRY),
"paying bills and keeping other financial
records" (BILLS), "auto maintenance and
repair" (AUTO), and "driving other household members to work, school, or other
activities" (DRIVING OTHERS). 6 A number of
respondents failed to provide responses to
questions about one or more household
tasks, particularly during the first wave of
interviews. NSFH personnel indicate that
many respondents to this wave left blanks
instead of filling in zeros as the directions
requested. Interviewers were instructed to
check for this during the second wave, thus
leading to substantially improved response
rates. Some non-responses from the first
wave can reasonably be assigned zero values based on answers to other questions.
For instance, driving time is set to zero for
those not answering the question about
time spent driving who reported that they
had not driven a car for over six months.
Other missing responses from the first wave
are coded zero if the respondent answered
at least six of the nine questions.' We
consider reported housework time to be
unreliable for those who failed to report
housework time in more than three categories at the time of the first survey, and for
those in either survey who reported "some"
time in an activity rather than a magnitude
or who reported an implausible 70 hours or

'The introductory wording for this series of questions was: "The questions on this page concern
household tasks and who in your household normally
spends time doing those tasks. Write in the APPROXIMATE number of hours per week that you,
your husband or wife, or others in the household
normally spend doing the following things. If no time
is spent doing the household task, write in '0.'"
7
The activities most often affected by this recoding
are OUTDOOR & MAINTENANCE and AUTO. There were
54 cases recoded with one missing housework measure, 22 with two, and 21 with three for the panelbased sample not missing information from the second-wave survey. We examine the robustness of the
estimates with respect to this imputation procedure
and to other sample selection criteria later.

more of housework activity per week. We
exclude the 263 respondents with unreliable housework measures from the housework time analyses, but include them in the
wage analyses with all housework measures
set to zero and two dummy variables to
indicate which survey contained the unreliable housework measure. Since these missing data were not entirely random but more
likely to arise for married and for disabled
men in the first wave, we perform a variety
of sensitivity tests, which are discussed later.
As the focus of this paper is on housework time, it is important to consider the
accuracy of the reported data. Juster and
Stafford (1991) provided an excellent discussion of time allocation studies. They
reported that survey data like those used
here tend to overstate true time spent on
most activities. Only in the case of activities
that are sporadic in nature, such as home
repairs, did they recommend use of survey
data to supplement diary-based measures.
Indeed, a comparison of diary-based data
from the Time Use Survey (TUS) with the
NSFH data employed here indicates substantial differences. Married men working
full-time reported an average of 11.01 hours
of housework per week in the TUS and
17.86 hours per week in this sample of
white, non-Hispanics from the NSFH. In
part, the difference may be due to an increase in housework done by men over time
between the TUS survey period of 1975-76
and the NSFH survey period of 1987-88,
but the magnitude of the difference suggests that housework time is likely to be
overstated in the NSFH.1 We investigate in
the empirical section whether measurement
error alters the findings of this paper by
using, among other variables, the wife's
report of her husband's housework time as
an instrument for the husband's own report.
Also of some concern is the lack of specific information on child care activities in

'We use the NSFH rather than the TUS primarily
because the NSFH has substantially more observations. Only 1,519 individuals of any age, race, or
gender were interviewed for the first wave of the TUS.
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Table 2. Time Spent by Men on Home Production per Week: First Wave of Panel Data.
Mean (Percent of Own Total Home Production Time)
Divorced,
Separated,
Widowed

Never
Married

Variable

Married

TOTAL

17.95

20.86

18.31

(100.0%)

(100.0%)

(100.0%)

2.44
(13.0%)
2.07
(11.1%)
1.82
(9.1%)
1.39
(8.1%)
0.77
(3.8%)
5.49
(31.1%)
1.68
(10.6%)
1.28
(7.8%)
0.99
(5.4%)

4.25
(19.5%)
2.66
(12.1%)
3.01
(13.7%)
1.67
(8.6%)
1.74
(8.8%)
3.42
(16.4%)
1.43
(7.3%)
1.62
(9.3%)
1.06
(4.1%)

3.66
(19.5%)
2.28
(11.7%)
2.32
(12.4%)
1.51
(8.9%)
1.49
(8.9%)
2.86
(15.9%)
2.04
(9.9%)
1.63
(10.5%)
0.52
(2.4%)

Significant
Differencesa

Panel A

Meals
Dishes
Cleaning
Shopping
Laundry
Outdoor & Maintenance
Auto
Bills
Driving Others

a
-

a,b
(a,b)
a
-

a,b
(a,b)
a
-

a,b
(a,b)
a,b
(a,b)
-

(a)
-

(b)
b,c
(b)

Panel Bb

Traditionally Female Tasks

8.50
13.33
11.27
a,b
(45.1%)
(62.8%)
(61.3%)
(a,b)
Traditionally Male Tasks
7.18
4.85
4.89
a,b
(41.7%)
(23.7%)
(25.8%)
(a,b)
Neutral Tasks
2.27
2.68
2.15
(13.2%)
(13.5%)
(12.9%)
aStatistically significant differences in means (or percent of total) at p < 0.01, where a = married vs. divorced,
separated, widowed; b = married vs. never married; and c = divorced, separated, widowed vs. never married.
bTraditionally female tasks are meals, dishes, cleaning, shopping, and laundry. Traditionally male tasks are
outdoor & maintenance and auto. Neutral tasks are bills and driving others.

the NSFH. Fortunately, many of the activities associated with children-like additional cleaning, cooking, and driving-appear to be incorporated in the housework
measures reported here. Married men with
children spent over one hour more per
week on housework than married men without children, while married women with
children spent over eight hours more per
week on housework than married women
without children. The types of child care
activities least likely to be included are
activities such as playing and reading, which
may be more accurately denoted leisure

activities. Nevertheless, to address concerns regarding the measurement of child
care activities, we estimate wage equations
that explicitly control for the number of
children in the household in our sensitivity
analysis.
Household Specialization
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics by
marital status for the housework-related
measures. The measures reported are based
on the sample of 1,110 observations with
valid housework data from the first wave of
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our panel data set. Descriptive statistics for
the second wave are similar and are available upon request. The first row indicates
that on average married men spent about
the same amount of time on housework as
did never-married men. Both spent, on
average, about 18 hours a week on household activities, while previously married
men spent a statistically significant 3 hours
more per week. Further calculations (not
reported in the table) show that, on average, men with employed wives spent more
time on housework than men whose wives
were not employed, but the difference is
only marginally significant (18.3 versus 16.6
hours: p-value = 0.09).
The statistics in Table 2 indicating that
married men spent about the same amount
of time on home production as did nevermarried men should not, however, be interpreted to mean that holding all else constant marital status and housework time are
uncorrelated. These unconditional means
do not control for differences in individual
circumstances or for differences in individual preferences that may influence time
spent on housework. Some changes in lifestyle occur as individuals age and as their
assets increase, even in the absence of marital status changes. Alternatively, it could be
that men who spend more time on housework are more likely to marry, but marriage
reduces their housework time. Thus, even
in the absence of specialization attributable to marriage, we may expect differences in time spent on household activities
according to individual and household characteristics.
To isolate the effect of marital status on
housework time from individual preferences and unobserved life-cycle factors that
are linear with age, we estimate fixed effects, reduced form housework equations
of the form
(1)

HOUSEWORKi, =

+

MARITSTAT ity + C, + gill

where HOUSEWORK, is time spent on housework by individual i at time t, Z is a vector
of observable characteristics expected to
affect time spent on housework, and
MARITSTAT is a vector of indicator variables

for marital status. The term C represents
an unobserved individual fixed effect, such
as taste for home production or for domestic comforts. First-difference estimation of
this equation nets out this unobserved individual fixed effect.
Estimates of housework equations are
presented in Table 3. The dependent variable in column (1) is total housework time
per week. The observable time-varying factors for which we control include marital
status, number of children under age 6,
number of children age 6-12, number of
children age 13-18, car ownership, and an
indicator of wife's employment status. Fully
1,066 men provide complete information
on these variables for both survey dates.
Most of the explanatory power is provided by the fixed effects, C., which jointly
explain 70% of the variation in reported
housework time. Each additional child
under age 6 adds about 80 minutes per
week to housework time. Older children
have a much smaller impact that is not
statistically significant. Buying a car increases housework time by over 2.5 hours
per week, but the effect is significant only at
the 10% level.
Although the raw means reported in
Table 2 reveal little difference in housework time between married and never-married men, the estimates in Table 3 provide
evidence that, conditional on other factors
influencing housework time and net of
unobserved individual fixed effects, marriage can allow men to specialize by decreasing their time on housework. In particular, conditional on other factors including a fixed individual-specific effect, those
men who married for the first time and
whose wives were not employed reported a
three-hour reduction in housework as compared to those whose marital status was
unchanged. 9 Wife's employment status
9
By reducing time on housework, marriage may
allow men to increase their time on market work. If
so, the marital wage differential could be explained

by increased investment in job-related human capital. In fact, the correlation between changes in house-

work time and changes in market hours is a statistically insignificant -0.025 for the sample that married

between waves.
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Estimates of Housework Hours per Week.,
Coefficient (Standard Error)
Variable
Married
Divorced, Separated, Widowed
Children under Age 6
Children Age 6-12
Children Age 13-18
Own Car
Married, Wife Employed

Total
Housework
-2.960**
(1.413)
1.705
(1.477)
1.377***
(0.460)
0.464
(0.449)
0.503
(0.466)
2.696
(1.566)
1.309
(0.817)

Traditionally
Femaleb

Traditionally
Male'

-1.782
(0.972)
3.391***
(1.016)
0.409
(0.316)
-0.089
(0.309)
-0.440
(0.321)
1.765
(1.078)
0.909
(0.562)

-1.107
(0.783)
-2.369***
(0.818)
0.687***
(0.255)
0.012
(0.249)
0.304
(0.258)
0.768
(0.868)
0.304
(0.453)

Neutral

d

-0.071
(0.382)
0.683
(0.400)
0.280***
(0.124)
0.541***
(0.121)
0.639***
(0.126)
0.162
(0.424)
0.096
(0.221)

2
.26
.41
.45
.39
Adjusted R
.05
.02
.04
R2 within
.02
aFixed effects equations estimated by first differences. Estimates are based on the sample of 1,066
observations who reported valid data for each variable in the analysis.
bTraditionally female tasks are meals, dishes, cleaning, shopping, and laundry.
cTraditionally male tasks are outdoor & maintenance and auto repair.
dNeutral tasks are bills and driving others.
**Statistically significant at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).

mitigates this marital effect, with married
men whose wives became employed reporting more time spent on housework, but this
spousal employment effect is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.11). Any time
saved during marriage, moreover, ended
when that marriage ended. Indeed, men
whose marriages ended reported spending
more time on housework than did nevermarried men with similar household characteristics, though the difference is not
statistically significant.
The results of pooled cross-sectional estimates are fairly similar. Men married to
women who were not employed reported
spending 2.9 fewer hours per week on housework than did never-married men (versus
3.0 in fixed effects). Men married to employed women also reported spending fewer
hours per week than did never-married
men, but the differential is smaller (1.0
versus 1.7 hours in fixed effects), and previously married men reported spending significantly more time on housework than

did never-married men (3.4 hours versus
1.7 in fixed effects).
Clearly marital status influences time
spent on housework, controlling for various personal characteristics. However, if
the link between marital status and wages
depends on the total amount of time, the
relatively small housework time difference
between married and never-married men,
regardless of wives' employment status, suggests that specialization does not explain
the substantial marriage premium in hourly
wages observed throughout the literature.
Specialization may, however, explain the
premium if different types of housework
have different effects on wages. Some types
of household activity may be more easily
postponed or scheduled so as not to interfere with market activities, and some may
almost complement market-related activities. If married men are generally less
involved in the types that reduce wages, the
observed marriage premium may simply
reflect this reduced involvement and could

THE MALE MARRIAGE WAGE PREMIUM
disappear once adequate controls for home
production are added to the wage equation.
Indeed, the allocation of total time
among household chores is quite different
by marital status. The descriptive statistics
in Table 2 indicate that married men spent
a significantly smaller share of their time
on meal preparation, cleaning, and laundry, and a significantly larger share of their
household time on outdoor work/home
maintenance, than did men who were not
married. It is interesting to note by comparison that previously married men spent
more time on housework than did nevermarried men, but allocated it similarly.
This differential allocation of housework
time can be seen even more clearly when
home production activities are grouped
into three activities using a classification
method employed by sociologists (for example, South and Spitze 1994). One purpose of the classification scheme is to distinguish among tasks that, within households, are disproportionately performed
by either the husband or the wife, or are
performed in nearly equal proportions by
husbands and wives. This classification
scheme simultaneously distinguishes between tasks that must be done fairly frequently, often on a daily basis, and those
that can be attended to less often and are
easier to postpone. Thus, meal preparation, dishes, cleaning, shopping, and laundry are categorized as "traditionally female"
type tasks, auto repair and outdoor/maintenance as "traditionally male" type tasks,
and bill paying and driving others as "neutral" tasks. Meal preparation and dishes
must typically be tackled daily, while outdoor work and home maintenance can vary
widely with the season and with household
or individual preferences. Outdoor work
and home maintenance can often be delayed, avoided, or contracted out.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the breakdown
of housework time using this classification
scheme. Married men spent about 45% of
their total housework time on traditionally
female tasks, compared to 63% for previously married men and 61% for never-married men. Calculations using our data (not

reported in the table) show that within
married households, the gender division of
tasks was quite pronounced. By the husbands' own estimates, their wives' share of
the total time spent on traditionally female
tasks was 76%. In contrast, the wives' share
of traditionally male tasks within the household was 18%, while the neutral tasks were
shared more equally, with wives performing 56% of the household total. If it is
primarily the daily tasks categorized here as
traditionally female that negatively influence productivity and wages, then married
men may earn a wage premium attributable
to specialization as they relinquish tasks in
this category.
Estimates examining whether these different categories of housework were affected differently by marital status are presented in columns (2)-(4) of Table 3. The
dependent variables in columns (2)-(4),
respectively, are time spent on traditionally
female tasks, traditionally male tasks, and
neutral tasks. Marriage had its greatest
effect on traditionally female tasks, reducing the time men spent per week on these
tasks by 1.8 hours (p-value of 0.067). Time
spent on traditionally male tasks was also
reduced, though the impact is not statistically significant, while time spent on neutral tasks was essentially unchanged. Again
the wife's employment status acted to mitigate changes in housework time. Finally,
while men whose marriages had ended reported spending about the same amount of
time on housework as never-married men,
the allocation is different. Consistent with
the unconditional sample means in Panel B
of Table 2, men whose marriages ended
between interviews spent significantly more
time on traditionally female tasks and less
time on traditionally male tasks than did
never-married men.
We also estimated housework equations
incorporating a measure of the hours
worked by the wife rather than simply an
indicator of her employment status. The
total time spent on housework was significantly affected by wife's market hours, primarily via its impact on traditionally female
activities. A husband whose wife worked 40
hours per week, for example, on average
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spent a statistically significant additional
1.8 hours per week on housework, 1.6 of
which were devoted to traditionally female
housework. However, since wife's market
hours were missing substantially more often than wife's employment status, we report in the text the results with the dummy
variable for employment status. Overall,
these findings indicate that the employment status of the wife does provide evidence of specialization as assumed in earlier studies, though a more direct measure
of housework would provide a richer measure.
Household Specialization and
the Marriage Wage Premium
To estimate the degree to which the
marriage wage premium is attributable to
household specialization, we begin by estimating the marriage wage premium itself
using a wage equation of the form
(2)

lnW, = Xt3

+ MARITSTAT,1 y

+ A, +

where lnW, is the logarithm of the real
hourly wage of individual i at time t; X is a
vector of observable individual, human capital, and job characteristics expected to affect the wage; MAR1TSTAT is a vector of marital characteristics including indicator variables for marital status and a quadratic in
years married; and A represents an unobserved individual fixed and time-invariant
effect, such as market ability. If men with
more ability are more likely to marry, omitting A imparts an upward bias to the estimate of the return to marriage. If this
unobserved characteristic is genuinely timeinvariant, fixed effects estimation eliminates
the unobserved fixed effect and provides
an unbiased estimate of the return to marital status. A comparison of fixed effects to
cross-sectional estimates provides information on the importance of selection.
We augment equation (2) by including
measures of time spent on home production to examine the impact of specialization on the marriage premium:
(3)

In W

= X.itP + MARITSTATty +

HOUSEWORKit 8 + A +

eit.

HOUSEWORK is a vector of home production

or specialization measures, measured as
either total time spent on housework or the
time spent on various types of housework.
This vector also includes two dummy variables to identify those 263 respondents
whose housework measures have been replaced by zeros because of unreliable values in either of the two waves. This approach controls for at least some forms of
sample selection bias. If it is specialization
that explains the marital wage differential,
then including HOUSEWORK, should drive y
to zero.
Table 4 presents the key coefficients for
wage equations (2) and (3). (Complete
results are available upon request.) In each
equation, the vector X includes controls
for education, quadratics in work experience and in tenure, and indicators for residence in the South, residence in an SMSA,
a job-related disability, eleven 1-digit industries, and seven 1-digit occupations. In
every case, the results indicate that wages
increase with education, and with experience and tenure at a decreasing rate.
The marriage premium is substantial and
statistically significant. The coefficients on
married and previously married are 0.090
and 0.104, indicating wage advantages of
9.4% and 11.0%, respectively, relative to
men who had never been married. A quadratic in years married is included in order
to permit wages to grow more rapidly during marriage, as would be the case if men
invest more in job-related human capital
while married. Neither the coefficient on
years married nor the coefficient on its
square is individually significant, although
a test of their joint significance yields a pvalue of 0.10.
Since tenure, industry, and occupation
may be affected by marital status, we also
estimate fixed effects models excluding
these variables. The results yield slightly
smaller coefficient estimates for both marital status indicators. This suggests that the
marital status effect is robust with respect
to any correlation between marital status
and work characteristics. (Results available
upon request.)
These fixed effects estimates of the mar-
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Table 4. Specialization and Fixed Effects Estimates of the Marriage Wage Premium.Coefficient (Standard Error)
Variable
Married
Divorced, Separated, Widowed
Years Married
Years Married Squared/100

(1)
0.090***
(0.036)
0.104**
(0.043)
0.003
(0.006)
0.017
(0.017)

Total Housework/100

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.087**
(0.036)
0.104**
(0.043)
0.003
(0.006)
0.017
(0.017)
-0.151
(0.086)

0.088**
(0.036)
0.104**
(0.043)
0.003
(0.006)
0.016
(0.017)

0.078**
(0.037)
0.107**
(0.044)
0.0004
(0.007)
0.026
(0.018)

0.074**
(0.037)
0.107**
(0.043)
0.0001
(0.007)
0.026
(0.018)
-0.166
(0.086)

0.033***
(0.012)
0.017
(0.013)
0.009
(0.013)
.77
.15

0.034***
(0.013)
0.017
(0.013)
0.009
(0.013)

Traditionally Female Housework/100

-0.098
(0.127)
-0.397
(0.306)
-0.143
(0.159)

Traditionally Male Housework/100
Neutral Housework/100
Children under Age 6
Children Age 6-12
Children Age 13-18
Adjusted R2
R 2 within

.76
.15

.77
.15

.77
.15

.77
.15

'Fixed effects estimates obtained by first differencing. Dependent variable is the log of hourly wage.
Additional variables included in each equation are a constant, education, experience, experience squared,
tenure, tenure squared, indicators for missing housework measures in each wave as well as for SMSA, South,
disability, eleven 1-digit industries, and seven 1-digit occupations.
**Statistically significant at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).

tal wage differential correct for some but
not all marriage selection concerns. Fixed
effects estimation should control for unobserved time-invariant individual-specific
characteristics that influence the probability of marriage. Cross-sectional estimates
of the specification in column (1) indicate
that married men earned about 11% more
than did never-married men. The smaller
impact of marriage in the fixed effects estimates (9.4% versus 11.0%) provides evidence that selection matters, but it explains
less than half of the marriage premium.
Turning to the estimates including housework time in columns (2) and (3), we find
in column (2) that housework has a negative effect on wages that is statistically significant at the 7% level, with ten additional

hours of housework time reducing wages
by about 1.7%.1 ° However, inclusion of this
measure has essentially no impact on the
magnitude of the marriage premium. The
coefficient on the married indicator variable drops slightly from 0.090 to 0.087.
Breaking down total housework into three
categories (traditionally female, traditionally male, neutral) in column (3) yields the

' 0These results are corroborated by Hersch and
Stratton (1997), who found that housework time has
a statistically significant negative effect on wages,
especially for married women, and the inclusion of
housework time in the wage equation increases the
explained component of the gender wage gap by
about 30%.
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same marital wage differential. None of
these categories individually has a statistically significant effect. Further analysis
(not reported here) including all nine types
of housework indicates that much of the
negative effect of total household tasks on
men's wages appears to be driven by time
spent on meal preparation and, to a lesser
extent, on outdoor/maintenance activities
and driving other household members, but
once again, the marriage premium declines
by less than 5%." Sensitivity tests indicate
that these results are robust with respect to
a variety of alternative specifications of the
marriage vector. 12
In order to address concerns about measurement of child care activities, we reestimate the wage equations reported in
columns (1) and (2), adding variables indicating the total number of children in each
of the three age groups. These results are
reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.
The marital wage differential shown in column (4) is clearly smaller than that observed in column (1), the coefficient having fallen from 0.090 to 0.078. Children of
all ages tend to increase wages, but the
effect is statistically significant only for children under the age of six. However, controls for housework time continue to have
no impact on the marital wage differential,
as indicated by a comparison of columns
(4) and (5). The results are similar when
we replace total housework with the three
types of housework or with the nine types of
housework.

"The dummy variables for missing housework information are discussed later, in the section devoted
to missing housework data.
2
Among the specifications tested were one without any controls for time married; one with controls
for time married and time separated, divorced, or
widowed; and one in which marital status was interacted with time married. In the latter specification,
wages appeared to rise less rapidly during marriage
for those whose marriages had since ended, but the
differential was not statistically significant at even the
10% level. Also estimated with robust findings were
fixed effects estimates excluding tenure, industry,
and occupation and pooled cross-section models.
These results are available upon request.

The marital wage differential observed
in this study differs somewhat from that
observed in other studies. Korenman and
Neumark (1991), for example, found that
dummy variables for marital status had significant coefficients in a fixed effects wage
specification that did not control for marital duration, but that these variables had no
statistically significant effect on wages once
controls for marital duration were included.
Gray (1997) reported no statistically significant marital wage effect at all in a fixed
effects model using data similar to
Korenman and Neumark's but from a later
time period.13 All of the previously cited
works on the marital wage differential, however, relied on samples in which the oldest
respondent was only 36 years old. The
average age of our sample is 35 in wave 1.
Both Korenman and Neumark (1991) and
Gray (1997) controlled for a quadratic in
experience but not for tenure, possibly
because of multicollinearity problems
within their young samples. In our sample,
experience and years married are highly
correlated. Excluding experience increases
the statistical significance of the marriage
duration coefficients but does not change
the basic results.
For comparison to earlier studies, we
estimated the wage equations restricting
the sample to those under the age of 35 in
the first wave (results available upon request). This age restriction results in substantial multicollinearity between experience, tenure, and years married. Given our
substantially smaller sample size in this age
group, multicollinearity problems make the
results difficult to analyze when we include
even two of these three variables. Excluding both years married and tenure yields a
coefficient of 0.03 for married men and
0.09 for previously married men. Korenman

"3Korenman and Neumark used data from the
National Longitudinal Survey, Young Men's Cohort
(NLSYM) for the years 1976, 1978, and 1980. Gray
used NLSYM data for the same years and National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data for the
years 1989, 1991, and 1993.
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and Neumark reported estimates of 0.06
and 0.04 using the same specification. These
results are not dissimilar, particularly given
the high standard errors associated with
each. Most important, inclusion of time
spent on housework in a wage equation for
this young sample does not affect the estimated marriage premium either.
We examined three additional hypotheses regarding the effect of housework on
wages. First, if time spent on housework
today influences the amount of on-the-job
investment today and hence wages tomorrow, then controls for the complete history
of housework time may influence wages or
wage growth. As a partial control, we include the only available earlier measure,
housework at the time of the first survey, in
the wage difference estimates. Introduction of this variable indicates that those
spending more time on traditionally female tasks in the first wave had slower wage
growth between waves. However, inclusion
of the level of housework time in the first
wave in any form leaves unchanged the
magnitude of the marital wage differential.
Second, the effect of housework time on
wage growth may differ by marital status.
Indeed, there is some indication that the
effect of housework was larger for those
previously married, but the terms interacting housework time with marital status are
not statistically significant either individually orjointly. Finally, the wage-enhancing
effects of specialization may be due to the
housework time spent by the wife rather
than that spent by the husband. Wage
equations including total or disaggregated
measures of wives' housework time indicate that wives' housework time was not a
statistically significant determinant of men's
wages.
In summary, the marital wage differential is remarkably persistent. It remains
even after we control for selection by allowing for fixed individual-specific effects.
Although there are substantial differences
by marital status in conditional hours of
housework, the marriage premium is unaffected by the inclusion of housework time
in the wage equation. If marriage makes
men more productive, it does not appear to

do so because of specialization within the
household.
Missing Housework Data
As discussed earlier, data on housework
time are missing far more often from the
first survey than from the second, and our
results could be attributed to the peculiarities of our housework data. We employed
an imputation procedure to assign zeros to
missing housework time in the first survey
for those individuals who provided valid
information on at least six of the nine types
of housework, and included dummy variables to identify the remaining observations with missing or invalid values in the
wage analysis. The coefficient on the
dummy variable indicating missing housework data from wave two is consistently
statistically insignificant, suggesting that
missing housework data from this wave are
uncorrelated with wages. The coefficient
on the dummy variable indicating missing
housework data from the first wave, however, is consistently positive, of the same
magnitude in all wage equations, and statistically significant at about the 7% level.
Since our first difference estimates subtract period 1 values from period 2 values,
the positive coefficient on the dummy variable implies that those failing to report
housework in wave one had significantly
lower wage growth between interviews. To
check the sensitivity of the wage equation
estimates to the imputation procedure, we
re-estimated the wage equations allowing
between zero and five missing values to be
imputed. The results were not sensitive to
this assignment. We also restricted the
analysis to only those observations that did
not require any imputation of housework
time and obtained similar results.
Endogeneity and Measurement Error
While sample selection and data definition problems regarding housework time
do not appear to influence the basic results
reported here, there are two other possible
sources of bias relating to housework. First,
housework time may be determined endogenously with the wage. Endogeneity driven
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by individual-specific time-invariant characteristics is remedied by the fixed effects
estimation technique employed above.
However, fixed effects estimation will not
eliminate other sources of endogeneity.
For instance, if men with faster wage growth
do less housework, the fixed effects estimates will themselves be biased.
Second, housework time may be measured with error. One possible form measurement error could take is through respondents' systematic over- or understatement of their housework time by a constant
amount in each wave. This source of measurement error would be eliminated in the
fixed effect estimates. But random measurement error will bias the estimated coefficient on housework toward zero, and this
bias is likely to be exacerbated in panel data
estimates."
In the presence of either endogeneity
bias or measurement error, the coefficient
on housework, and on any other variable
correlated with housework (such as marital
status), will be biased. A possible solution
to both problems is instrumental variables
estimation. The data set provides a wide
array of plausible instruments for housework time. Since many of these potential
instruments are constant over the panel
and since the explanatory power of the
time-varying covariates in the panel data
housework equations is low, we use only the
first wave cross-section reporting valid data
on housework so that we can include a
broader set of instruments. In particular,
we use as instruments car ownership; eight
measures of the number of other adults in
the household (distinguishing between

male and female children age 19 and older,
male and female parents, male and female
other relatives, and male and female nonrelatives); the respondents' parents' education; three variables indicating whether
the respondent's mother worked outside
the home when the respondent was under age 6, age 6-11, or age 12-17; and
five missing value indicators for these
latter five variables. (Results available
upon request.)
A Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent,
indicating that neither endogeneity nor
measurement error is a substantial problem. Coefficient estimates for the housework measure are statistically insignificant
in both OLS and IV estimates. A test of the
power of the instruments not also in the
wage equation indicates that these instruments are jointly significant. In addition, a
Lagrange Multiplier test confirms that the
instruments do not themselves belong in
the wage equation; the exclusion restrictions are valid.' 5 Varying the instrument
set to test the exogeneity of the instruments with respect to wages yields similar
results: the instruments appear to be
exogenous.
Although technically these instruments
are valid, the overall fit of the housework
equation is weak, with an adjusted R' of
0.03. Our failure to find evidence of
endogeneity or of measurement error may
be due to our weak instrument set. At least
for the case of measurement error, we can
test this hypothesis on a subset of observations by introducing what is certainly a
powerful instrument: the wife's report of
her husband's housework time. This instrument is necessarily available only for

4

The primary concern in other studies examining
the marriage premium has been the endogeneity of
marriage. As discussed earlier, to the extent that men
who marry are more productive, the marital wage
effect will be biased upward in cross-sectional estimates. Fixed effects estimation removes this type of
endogeneity bias, but not, for example, selection
based on wage growth. As mentioned earlier, neither
Korenman and Neumark (1991) nor Gray (1997)
found evidence of such selection.

15The value of the Hausman test statistic is 1.72.
This statistic is distributed chi-squared with 30 degrees of freedom and soundly fails to reject the null
hypothesis that housework is exogenous. The test
statistic for the power of the instruments is 1.91. It is
distributed F with 19 and 1133 degrees of freedom.
The Lagrange Multiplier test statistic, distributed chisquared with 19 degrees of freedom, is 16.2.
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the subsample of married men whose wives
provided such a report.
Within this sample of 465 married men,
the inclusion of wife's report increases the
adjusted R2 of the housework equation from
0.011 to 0.086; the wife's report is clearly
highly correlated with the husband's report, making it a good instrument. A
Lagrange Multiplier test confirms that the
exclusion restrictions are valid; the wife's
report does not itself belong in the wage
equation. For this sample of married men,
the coefficient on housework in the IV
specification is -0.27 (p-value = 0.56), while
the corresponding coefficient in OLS estimates is -0.07 (p-value = 0.68). The difference in magnitude provides some evidence
of measurement error, but neither estimate provides statistical evidence strong
enough to warrant much attention. The IV
and OLS coefficients in the wage equation
are not statistically significantly different:
a Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis
that housework is exogenous with respect
to wages. As this sample has been restricted
to married men, no estimate of the marital
wage differential can be obtained using
these data, but these findings suggest that
measurement error is not a serious problem and that our earlier failure to reject
exogeneity is not simply due to weak instruments.
Conclusion
From the perspective of economists, an
important benefit of marriage is that it
allows spouses to specialize in either market or home production, creating a bigger
"pie" to be shared by all members of the
household. Historically, husbands have
been more likely to specialize in the market. The commonly observed marriage
premium for men is frequently attributed
either to selection of more productive men
into marriage or to enhanced productivity
resulting from the specialization possible

within ajoint household. In this paper, we
examine the specialization hypothesis. We
present evidence on the amount of time
spent in home production by men according to their marital status. We then examine the impact that controlling for home
production activities and selection has on
the estimated marriage premium.
Our results indicate that the marriage
premium is not primarily due to the selection of more productive men into marriage. In the sample we examine, marriage
does seem to have made men more productive in the market. However, this enhanced
productivity does not seem to have resulted
from household specialization. There is
little difference by marital status in the
total amount of time men spent on home
production, although there are differences
in the type of home production activities.
Not surprisingly, married men spent less
time than unmarried men on tasks such as
cooking and cleaning. With little difference in the total time spent on housework,
the only way specialization can explain the
premium is if different types of housework
have different effects on wages. While we
find evidence that own time spent on home
production negatively affected wages, controlling for housework time does not have
a substantial impact on the measured marriage premium.
If specialization does not make married
men more productive, what could explain
the marriage premium? Married men may
get preferential treatment from employers,
such as more training or promotions. Or
men may become better workers because of
the stability induced by marriage. These
explanations cannot be modeled using an
individual fixed effect, since they suggest
an actual change in behavior resulting from
marriage or the decision to marry. If neither selection nor specialization explains
the differential, then more attention should
be paid to alternative explanations such as
these.
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